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We provide a simple explanationfor theobservationthatthevarianceof job destructionis
greaterthanthevarianceof job creation:job creationis costlier atthemarginthanjob destruction.
As Caballero [2] has argued,asymmetricemployment adjustmentcosts atthe establishmentlevel
need not imply asymmetricvolatility of aggregatejob flows. We constructanequilibriummodel
in which (S,s)-type employment policies respond endogenously to aggregate shocks, The
macroeconomic asymmetries in the model can darnpenthe response of total job creation to an
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Chicago, IL 606041. Introduction
In this paper we provide a simple explanation for the observation documented by Davis
and Haltiwanger [7, 8] that the variance of job destruction is greater than the vmiance of
job creation: job creation is costlier at the margin than job destruction. As Caballero [2]
has argued, asymmetric employment adjustment costs at the establishment level need not
imply asymmetric volatility of aggregate job flows. We construct an equilibrium model in
which (S, s)-type employment policies respond endogenously to aggregate shocks. Contrary
to Caballero [2], we find that macroeconomic asymmetries can dampen the respome of job
creation to an aggregate shock and cause it to be less volatile than job destruction.
The employment policies we consider me ones for which an =tablishrnent keeps employ-
ment constant if it lim within a range determined by its idiosyncratic level of technology. If
employment is initially above this range it is reduced to the range’s upper boundary, and
if it is below it is increased to the lower boundary. The difference between our results and
Caballero’s [2] lies in how the ‘range of inaction’ responds to aggregate disturbances. If we
assume its boundwies respond equally in percentage terms to aggregate disturbances, then
total job creation and destruction will change by similar amounts.l In this case creation
and destruction will be, roughly, equally variable, as in Caballero [2]. However, if we solve
for the optimal response of the boundaries, job creation costs can cause the lower bound-
ary to be less elastic with respect to an aggregate disturbance than the upper boundary.
Because the level to which job destroyers reduce their employment changes by more than
the level to which job creators increase their employment, total job destruction can respond
proportionately by more than creation, leading to the former being more variable than the
latter.
The asymmetric volatility of aggregate job flows is closely tied to another fact docu-
mented by Davis and Haltiwanger which has received considerable attention in the literature.
Namely, the observation that job reallocation, the sum of job creation and job destruction,
is countercyclical. The algebraic identities linking job growth (job creation less job destruc-
1Here we are implicitly s.ssuming sticient variability in idiosyncratic technology and symmetric aggregate
disturbances.
2tion) and reallocation to job creation and destruction imply that job reallocation co-vari=
negatively with job growth if and only if job datruction is more volatile than job creation.
Thus our explanation for asymmetric volatility in aggregate job flows can be added to the
list of potential explanations for countercyclical job reallocation.2
Our analysis builds on Hopenhayn’s [11] industry dynamics model of establishment size.
This is a natural starting point because the job creation and destruction data reflect es-
tablishment growth and contraction. Anderson and Meyer [1] document large differences
between match creation and destruction and job creation and destruction. This suggests
an advantage of our approach to understanding the phenomena documented by Davis and
Haltiwanger relative to other approaches which focus on the job matching process.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we present the indus-
try dynamics model and characterize stationary and dynamic equilibria. In section three we
analwyze several parametric examples of the model to illustrate the impact on aggregate vari-
abl~ of asymmetric employment adjustment costs at the ~tablishment level. We conclude
in the fourth section by relating ow findings to other attempts in the literature to account
for the behavior of aggregate job flow%.
2. The Industry Dynamics Model
We extend Hopenhayn’s [11]industry dyntics model to incorporate linearjob creation costs
and uncertainty about labor supply. A key feature of the model that makes it tractable to
analyze is the assumption of unrestricted entry into the industry. As we describe below, this
assumption remov= the probability distribution of =tablishrrtents as a state variable in the
problems of individual agents, drastically lowering the computational complexi~ involved
in solving the model. We begin by describing the model environment. This is followed by
a description of the problem of a representative establishment owner in the industry. After
this we define a competitive equilibrium and chmacterize stationary equilibria and equilibria
with aggregate uncertainty.
2See for example Cabrdlero fid Hamrnour [4] and Mortensen and Pisaarid= [13] who emphasize the
role of the job matching process in generating this phenomenon. Campbell and Kuttner [6] and Davis and
Haltiwanger [9] interpret counter-cyclical job reallocation as reflecting the itiuence of ‘reallocation shocks.’
32.1. The Model Environment
The model’s industry consists of a continuum of &tablishments which each produce a single,
non-storable good for sale in a competitive market. Aggregate demand for the good in
period t, is a given by ~~, where Pt is the market price and T <0 is the elasticity of demand.
Each establishment produces output using labor as its ordy variable input. We assume the
industry is a small portion of the economy so that the wage rate, W’t,is exogenous. It follows
a Markov chain over the grid { W1, Wh} and is the only source of industry-wide, or aggregate,
uncertain y.
Output of a representative establishment at time t depends on its time t productivity




The diminishing returns to labor reflect the presence of a fixed factor which can be tbought
of = a plant. We assume that the shift length is fixed so that nt can be interpreted as
employment. For each establishment, productivity y evolves as follows,
lnzt = pzlnzt-l +et, e, ~N(o!~;) , IP.I <1
Entry to the industry is unrestricted and potential entrants face a cost of creating a new
establishment, K. When a new establishment is born, it draws its initial value of productivity y
fi-om a continuous distribution with p.d.j-. A(.). Establishment owers face an exit decision
every period. When making this decision they take into account the scrap due of an
establishment, 0< K. The decision to close an establishment is irreversible. Establishment
owners are identical, risk neutral, and discount future profits with a common rate, P.
The owner of an establishment incurs an adjustment cost if it expands its employment.
Since new establishments begin life with no employees, they must always incur this adjust-
3Our notational convention is to use upper case to denote aggregate variables, lower case to denote
establishment level variablea and Greek letters to denote parameters.
4ment cost. If nt is an establishment’s previous employment, its job creation costs are
T(nt – nt–l)I{nt > nt–l} ,
where T > 0 is the per job creation cost. The function 1
is true and zero otherwise. We interpret these job creation
{.} equals one if its argument
costs m reflecting the costs of
reorgtizing the tasks performed in a establishment
2.2. The Establishment Owner’s Problem
to accommodate a lager work force.
At the beginning of a period, the owner of an establishment observes its productivity, z~,and
the output and input pric=, PLand Wt. On the basis of this information, employment at
each establishment is chosen. At the end of the period, owners must decide whether or not
to close their establishments. Let St denote a vector of payoff relevant aggregate variables.
It m-illinclude the cuurent output and input prices, Pt and W~,w well as any other variables
whi& aid in forecasting their
time t. t!(z~,n~-l, St), satisfies
v(z,, n,-~, s,) =
future values. Then, the value of a typical establishment at
the following Bellman equation,
rnn Ptztn~ – Wtnt – T(nt – nt-l) I{nt > nt_l}
+flm= {0, E [v(z~+l,n~,S~+l)Iz~,St]}. (1)
In solving its dynamic program, the establishment owner is assumed to know the underlying
law of motion for St. We now discuss the optimal employment and exit policies which
corr-pond to the solution to the establishment owner’s problem.
As is well known, it is optimal in the presence of linear adjustment costs to follow an (S, s)-
type policy. To chmacterize the employment policy for the present case, let f+ (z~,nt, St)
denote the right derivative of ~ max {0, E [v(z~+l,n~,St+l) Izt, St]} with respect to nt, and
let j- (z~,nt, s~) denote the left derivative. Then, the necessary conditions for the owner’s
employment decision are
~-1 – Wt –r+~- (z~,nc,S~) < 0 if nt 2 nt-1 aPt ztnt
5
(2)~–1 – W~+ ~+ (Z~,nt,S~) ~ Oif nt < nt-l- aPtztnt (3)
If nt > nt_l, then equation (2) must hold with equality, and if n, < nt-l, then equation (3)
must hold with equality. Define ~ (zt) and fit (zt) as the values of nt which satisfy equations
(2) and (3), respectively, with equality, for each possible value of zt. The dependence of th=e
functions on t is our notational shorthand for the fact that they depend on the aggregate
state St. The optimal employment policy now cm be written as
(4)
Below we refer to ~t (zt) as the date t job cmtion schedule since it indicates the employment
levels of job creating establishments. Similmly, we refer to fit (z, ) = the job datwction
schedule.
Just as in Hopenhayn [11], a threshold rtie characterizes the owner-s etit decision. This
is explained as follows. Notice first that the unique solution to (1) must be incr-ing in
zt, which implies that E [v (zt+l, nt, St+l) Izt, St] is increasing in z~. Thus there exists a
threshold value, zt (nt),
Zt (nt) = sup{zlE [v(zt+l, nt, St+l) Izt= z, St] s 8}, (5)
such that all =tablisbents with employment equal to nt and z~s zt (nt) will exit, and all
others will remain. The exit threshold in general depends on the aggregate state which we
again summarize with the subscript t.
2.3. Competitive Equilibrium
In order to define a competitive equilibrium it remains to d~cribe entry, aggregate quan-
tities and the transition rule for the distribution of establishments across productivity and
employment levels. Comider entry first. Because entry is unrestricted, the expected value
6of an entering establishment must be less than or equal to its cost, K, for all St. That is,
/~(zt)o)st)A(zt) dzt<KVs,. (6)
If any entry occurs during period t, then (6) must hold with equality. We use Bt to denote
the mass of new entrmts, or births, at time t.
Total industry labor input and output, N~and Qt, respectively, are defined as follows,
Nt =
1/
ntGt (zt ,~t)~zt~~t ,
~t = // qtGt (zt, nt) dztdnt.
(7)
(8)
Here G~(., -) summarizes the
tivity and employment levels
measure of mtablishments
at time t.
across all possible pairs of produc-
The employment policy, (4), endows Gt with certain properties. First, it implies that
(9)
Gt (z~.n~)= 0 if nt < nt (zt)or if nt > Et(zt). Second, it implies a positive fraction of
=tablishments will be on the schedties defined by ~ (zt) and Et(zt). Therefore, Gt (z~,nt)
m be written in terms of three functions, Gt (zt), ~t (zt) and G~ (zt, nt),
[
~ (Zt) , if nt = D (zt) ,
G, (zt, nt) = G? (zt, nt) , if ~ (~) < nt < ~t (zt) ,
Ct (z,) , if nt = fit (zt) .
The owner’s employment, entry, and exit decisions determine the transition rule for Gt. The
presentation of this truition rule is straightforward but tedious, and so is left to appendix
A.
In a competitive equilibrium, all potential entrants are either indfierent to entering or
strictly prefer to stay out of the industry, all of the industry’s estabolishmentowners choose
employment and m~e exit decisiom to mtimize the present discounted value of their
expected profits, and both the product and labor markets clear. The following definition
summmizes this more formally.
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium). A competitive equilibrium for the ind~try
7is a set of state contingent sequencw {P:}, {Qj}, {NJ}, {B;}, {n: (z~,n~-1)}, {x; (nt)}, and
{G; (z,, n,)} and a-due function v“ (z,, nt-l, S:) such that ford] -t
2. v“ (z~,nt-l, S;) is the m“que solution to (1) given the stochastic proc- for S: =
(P~,W~,G;(~,,nt)).
3. n; (z~,n~-l) is defined as in (4).
4. Z; (n,) is defined as in (5).
5. N: is defined as in (7).
6. Q; is defined as in (8).
7. The free entry condition, (6), holds in even. Passible state. It holds with equtity in
any state where B; >0.
8. G; (zt, n~) is defined recumively as in appendti .4.
Hopenha~ [11] shows that a competitive equilibrium exists and is tique in a similar
industry dynamics model without aggregate uncertainty. Before proceeding to the charac-
terization of the competitive equilibrium with aggregate uncertainty, it is helpful to fist
study the model’s steady state, an equilibrium in which all prices and aggregate quantities
are constant.
2.4. The Steady State
Consider a version of the above model in which the wage rate equals some constant, W*. A
stationa~ equilibriumfor this model is a competitive equilibrium in which all other aggregate
prices and qumtities are also constant. We can compute the stationary equilibrium as follows.
First consider the solution to (1) given the constant wage md some constant output price, P.
Since v (zt, nt-l, St) is continuous and strictly increasing in P, u (P) = Jw(z,, O,St) A(zt) dz,
is also. Because u (0) = O and limp+~ u (P) = m, there must exist a unique P* such that
8u (P”) = K, This is the unique stationary equilibrium output price. From the associated
solution to (1) the stationary equilibrium employment and exit policies, n* (zt, nt–1) and
x* (n~), can be derived.
Given the owner’s stationary equilibrium policies and a value for entry, B, we can find
a fixed point of the transition equation for the measure of mtablishments over productivity
and employment. Denote this G (zt, nt). It is straightforward to show that G (zt, nt) is linear
in B, which, via (8), implies output is linear in B also. The equilibrium volume of entry, B*,
is easily found by solving for the value of B which equates industry supply with the quantity
demanded at the previously mrived at output price, P*T. With B* in hand, G* (zt, n~), Q*,
and N* can be computed.
Notice that because G (zt, n~) is a linear function of entry, B* only determines the in-
dustry’s scale. It does not i~uence the probability distribution of establishments across
productivity and employment levels. In the stationary equilibrium analysis of Hopenhayn
[11], this distribution is the primary object of interest. Because the establishment owner is a
price taker, the demand elasticity ~ does not effect the solution of her dynamic programming
problem in a stationary equilibrium. Therefore, ~ only tiects the industry’s scale also.
2.5. Equilibrium with Aggregate Uncertainty
We can construct an equilibrium of the model with a stochastic wage rate in much the
same way as for a stationmy equilibrium. The key once again is the free entry condition,
(6). If the volume of entry is always positive, then the free entry condition must always be
satisfied with equality. In this cme, the equilibrium price sequence is uniquely determined
by the stochmtic process for the wage, the owner’s dynamic programming problem, and the
free entry condition. This simplifies the analysis considerably because it implies it is not
necessary to include Gt as an argument in the ~tablishment owner’s policy functions.4 We
now d~cribe how to solve the model with aggregate uncertainty in more detail.
Suppose that Bt is always strictly positive in equilibrium and that the output price is a
function of the current wage only. Because the wage takw on one of two values, so must the
A cab~lero ~d H~O~ [3]~ a si~lu arg~ent to solve their model of job creationandd~truction.
9price. Let PI and Ph be the output prices when the wage equals WI and W~, respectively.
l~en the output price follows this stochastic process, the solution to the owner’s dynamic
programming problem can be written as the pair of functions V1(zt, n~.l ) and v~(zt, nt-l ).
These are the solutions to (1) when the wage is W~ and W~, respectively. Given these
functiom, one can compute the value of entry in the two states as a function of the prices:
u’(P’,Ph)= /v’(zt,O)A(zt)dzt andu~(~’,~’) = /v~(zt,O)~(zt)dzt.
Unrestricted entry drives profits to zero so we can use (6) holding with equality to find
candidate equilibrium prices. That is, candidates for equilibrium prices solve the following
system of two non-linear equations in two unknowns,
u’(P*,P’*) = K.,
u’(P”,P’”) = K.
Given three prices it is possible to compute quantities sequenti~y for any given real-
ization of the process { W’t} and an initial condition for the industry. Go (~, M). To see
this, suppose that in the first period. IV1= W1, so that the candidate equilibrium price for
the first perod is PI = P 1. Since the transition rule for Gt, in the appendix, implies that
G1 (zl, nl) is m increasing function of entry, (8) implies that the total quantity produced
by the industry’s establishments at PI also is an increasing function of entry. Write this
relationship m Q1 (B). In the competitive equilibrium, the volume of entry must be exactly
that which clews the market for the industry’s good. So a candidate for equilibrium entry
in the first period, B1, solves
Q, (Bl) = P:.
With B1 in hand, one can compute GI (zl, nl ) and any aggregate variable of interest. The
analogous procedure applies to future quantities.
The candidate equilibrium for a given sequence of wagw will be a genuine equilibrium
as long as entry is strictly positive in every period. So, for example, if Q1 (0) > P: then
the constructive procedure fails. However, if the model has a stationary equilibrium with
10B* >0 and the support of Wt is narrow enough, the assumption that B~ is always strictly
positive should be satisfied. In appendix B we study a version of the model with aggregate
uncertainty but without job creation costs in which strictly positive entry is guaranteed to
hold. Using homotopy ideas we can expect versions of our model with positive job creation
costs to involve strictly positive entry as well. Indeed, in the simulations conducted for the
analysis in the next section entry is always strictly positive.
3. Job Creation Costs and Aggregate Employment Fluctuations
In this section we investigate the implications of job creation costs in our model. When job
creation costs are positive then we find that job d~truction may be more volatile than job
creation. To build intuition for this finding, it is useful to consider a version of our model
where ~ = O. In such a model, establishments’ employment decisions are entirely static
and analytical expressions for the job destruction and creation schedules, fit (zt) and Dt(zt),




a—l ~~ (z~) = md n~(zt) = —
aPtzt aP~zt “
Now consider how these schedules respond to exogenous changes in the wage rate. The
relevant elasticities are,
~ln(~, (z,)) = 1 ~ W, ~d ~~(fit (zt)) _ 1
alnw,
_—
a—l Wt+r alnwt a–l”
Clearly, as long as job creation costs are positive, the job destruction schedde is more elastic
with r~pect to the wage than the job creation schedule. In response to a wage disturbance
the level to which job destroyers reduce their employment will vary by more than the level
to which job creators increase their employment. Other things equal, the larger the creation
cost, the greater the discrepancy between how much total job creation changes relative to
total job destruction. If dynamic considerations do not overcome these purely static effects,
then the foregoing suggests that we have some hope of accounting for the excess volatility
of job destruction with our model.
11The arguments in Caballero [2]should caution us in drawing conclusions about aggregate
variables from underlying rnicroeconomic behavior. As he has forcefully tigued, the evolu-
tion of the underlying distribution of establishments can have significant effects on aggregate
variables and lead them to behave very differently than establishment level variables. This
makes it crucial for us to simulate the model to derive its implications for aggregate employ-
ment fluctuations. In the rest of this section we describe the results of doing this for several
different parameterizations. We begin by describing the main parameter selections which
underlie our simulations. This is followed by a brief discussion of the implied steady state
of the model which is designed to shed light on the empirical plausibility of our parameter
selections. Finally, we discuss the simdation results.5
3.1. Parameter Values
The examples we consider share the same stationary equilibrium. In table 1 we list the
parameters which underlie this equilibrium. For the most part these parameters were chosen
so that statistics derived fro[n the implied station~ equilibrium resemble selected statistics
reported by Davis and Haltiwanger [8] for the US manufacturing sector. Specifically, we
attempt to match the average rate of job destruction as well as the average employment
weighted entry and exit rat~. ~ We use the variance of the innovation to technology, a=,
the scrap value, 19,and the support of
accomplish this. We follow Hopenhayn
new entrants’ productivity, A(.). It is
the distribution for new entrants’ productivity to
and Rogerson [12] in specifying the distribution of
assumed to be uniform with support that ranges
5Detaila on the solution and simldation procedure are available horn the authors if requested. The
broad outlinm of our procedme are as follows. We proceed in two steps. In the 6rst step we solve for the
equilibrium prices and in the semnd step we simulate using an appraximation to the trmition equation
for G. To arrive at the equilibrium prim we have to solve the owner’s Bellman equation. We do this by
approximating the value function with a polynomial and then finding a fied point in the pmmeters of
the approximating polynomial. The solution to the Bellmm equation impli~ employment and exit policiw,
which, as is described in appendix A, determine the transition equation for G. We employ the method
dwcribed in CarnpbeU [5] b approximate the transition equation. Given an initial G, an approximate rule
for updating G, and a sequence of pseud~random wagea, a sequence of G’s can be generated. Using the
constructive procedwe d=ribed in section 2.5 an entry sequenm can also be generated. Quantiti~ of
interwt can then be mmputed directly from their detitiona.
G Because the calculation of the stationary equilibrium is computationally intensive, a more formal pro
cedure for pmameter selection in which stationary equilibrium quantitiw are precisely matched with their










Table 1: Baseline Parameter Valu=
horn three standard deviations less than the mean of the unconditional distribution to some
upper bound. By varying the upper bound we are able to improve our match with the
stationary equilibrium statistics of interest. The support we use throughout the analysis is
[-3~z/J=)ln(l.4)].
Other parameters in table 1 are chosen on a ptiori grounds. The cost
a normalization so it has no consequence for the analysis. Labor’s share
function, a, is chosen to be consistent with other quantitative studies.
of entry, K, is just
in the production
We assume that
the period length in the model is a quarter and that establishment owners discount future
profits at an annualized rate of 5 per cent. This determin= the discount rate, ~. The
autocorrelation of technology for ~tablishments, p=, is chosen to be consistent with the
observation that there is substantial employment persistence in the manufacturing data. Of
ptiictiar interest is the job creation cost, r. Since we normalize the steady state wage to
unity, our selection of 0.5 for this parameter is equivalent to one half the quarterly wage
in steady state. This does not seem exceptionally large to us. Finally, we use a demand
elasticity of 1/4. The selection of this parameter is governed by the need to ensure that
along a given simulation entry always is strictly positive.
3.2. Properties of the Stationary Equilibrium
In the stationary equilibrium, the establishments’ employment policies can be summarized
by the job creation and destruction schedules, ~ (zt) and ii. (zt), and the exit policy X. (nt).
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Figure 1: Establishment Policies – ~ (zt), fio (z~), and Z. (nt).
Figure 1 plots th- using the p~ameter value in table 1. As this figure indicates, just
as in the model utithoutjob creation ctis, establishments’ employment policies are nearly
log-linear in z,. .%clear exception to this is a discontinuity where each of the employment
schedules cross the tit schedule. The exit schedule itself is nearly vertical, so establishments
exit decisions vary little with their current employment.
The employment and exit polici~ determine the stationq equilibrium distribution of
establishments acrm employment and productivity levels. The components of this dis-
tribution me plotted in figures 2 and 3. The panels of figure 2 graph the distribution of
=tablishments along the destruction and creation schedules. These are Go (zt) and ~ (z~)
normalized by the total mass of establishments, respectively. Figure 3 plots cross-sectiom of
Gm (zt, nt) normalized by the total mass of establishments, the distribution in the region of
inaction. Specifically, each curve in this figure indicates, for a given log employment level,
the density in the region of inaction as a function of the log of technology.
The fist point to note from the figures is that job creating establishments tend to be
more productive than job d~troying ones. The peak of ~ (z~ ) is at a log technology level of
about 0.35, while the peak of Go (zit) is at about –0.2. Second, there is considerable mms
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Figure 2: Station~ Equilibrium Distribution -co (zt) and Go (z~)
on both the job creation and datruction schedul=. Establishments which lie on the job
creation schedule account for 20.470of total industry employment, and establishments which
lie on the job destruction schedule account for 16.5% of employment. Third, the distribution
within the region of inwtion is discontinuous, reflecting the discontinuities in the creation and
destruction schedules. Finally, the establishments that lie between the intervention schedules
do not appear to be bunched up nem one schedtie or the other consistently throughout the
state spwe. That is, with the exception of establishments that operate in the left hand tail
of the productivi~ distribution, the densi~ does not exhibit substantial asymmetry in the
placement of mass near one employment policy relative to the other.
For the same parameter values, table 2 reports job creation and d~truction statistics
horn the model’s stationary equilibrium. In a stationary equilibrium, the job creation and
destruction rates equal each other. The fact that they Mer somewhat in table 2 reflects
slight errors in our method of approximating the transition equation. Notice that the job
creation and destruction ratw in the stationmy equilibrium are about 1~0and 0.6% higher
than their empirical counterptis. Therefore, the job reallocation rate is about 1.6~0higher
than the average job reallocation rate in the US manufacturing sector. The employment
15Dlstrlt>utlon Within Region of Inaction
Figure 3: Stationary Equilibrium Distribution - Gm (z,, n,)
Statistic Data Model
Job Creation 5.39 6.34
Job D-truction 5.72 6.38
Job Reallocation 11.11 12.72
Entry 0.61 0.81
Exit 0.82 0.49
Table 2: Employment Statistia from Stationary Equilibrium
Notes: (i) Entries are in per cent; (ii) Entri~ in the data column are taken horn Davis and
Haltiwmger [8].
16weighted entry md exit rates are 0.270 higher and 0.33% lower, respectively, than the values
reported by Davis and Haltiwanger [8]7.
Although the model’s implied statistics do not exactly match the statistics from the US
manufacturing sector, they seem reasonably close. This gives us some confidence that the
simulations we present in the next section have empirical relevance.
3.3. Employment Fluctuations
The examples we describe in this subsection are differentiated by assumptions regarding the
forcing process for the wage rate and assumptions regarding the specification of creation
costs. Consider the wage proc~ fist. The law of motion for the wage is chosen so that
the log of the wage resembles a first order autoregression with an unconditional standmd
deviation of 1%. In particular, the transition matrix, H, is specified as
where lpW [ <1 is the autocorrelation coefficient, and the two wage levels are given by
Wh= exp (0.01) and WL= exp (–0,01).
We explore the implications of aut~comelated wages, pW= 0.9, and i.i.d. wages, pW= O.
Now consider the assumptions regmding job creation costs. In section 2 these costs were
=Urned to be invariant to the current wage.8 If job creation activity is labor intensive,
then this may be a poor assumption since it would suggest that creation costs should be
closely tied to the wage. This invariance plays a crucial role in the development of our
intuition, so it is sensible to explore how it itiuences our results. To do so, in addition to
the case of comtant creation costs we explore versions of our model in which creation costs
are proportional to the current wage. In these cas= creation costs are assumed to be equal
7The employment weighted entry and exit ratw are the employment gains at entering =tablishments and
the employment losses at exiting establishments, divided by total manufacturing employment.
‘It may be helpful at this point h think of the output price, the wage, and the job crwtion mst as being
measured relative to the cost of creating an establishment, ~.
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Figure4: Chang=in Job Creation and D~truction Schedules
to ~Wt in each period t.
Before studying the simulation r~dts it is helpful to cofim that adding job creation
costs to the establishments’ technology dampens the employment r~ponses of job creating
establishments to chang~ in W~. Figure 4 plots the differences between the job creation
and destruction schedul~ in the two states. The solid lin~ of each panel plot the log of
the destruction schedule in the low wage state minus the log of the destruction schedule in
the high wage state and the dashed lines plot the dtierence between the creation schedules
in the two states. The top panel pertains to the examples in which job creation costs are
constant, md the bottom panel pertains to the examples where job creation costs are a
constant fraction of the current wage.
Consistent with our intuition, when the job creation cost is constant the job destruction
schedule is considerably more volatile than the job creation schedde. Regardless of the degree
of serial correlation in the wage, the job destruction schedule changes about 2.570more than
18the job creation schedule when the wage changes. Notice that an establishment’s response
to a change in the wage depends on its current productivity. For those establishments falling
below the exit threshold, their employment decisions are static. That is, their employment
decisions are those from the model with @ = O. For those establishments above the exit
thr~hold, dynamic considerations become important. These considerations appear to raise
and then lower their responses to a change in the wage as their productivity increases.
Finally, serial correlation in the wage appears to amplify the responses for establishments
above the exit threshold but has little effect on those establishment about to exit.9
In the lower panel of figure 4 we see that the job creation and destruction schedules
respond by roughly equal amounts to a wage change, regardless of the degree of serial cor-
relation in the wage. The dynamic effects on the shapes of the schedules evident in the top
panel are evident here also and these dynamic effects appear to be strong relative to the
purely static effect emphasized in the development of our intuition. As in the constant cost
case, adding wage persistence appears to amplify the response of the schedul= for higher
productivity establishments.
We conclude from analyzing figure 4 that the model’s behavior depends in important ways
on the specification for job creation costs. In the US economy, job creation probably requir~
some labor input. Thus creation costs will likely vary with the wage. On the other hand,
the cost’s elasticity with respect to the wage will be less than one if job creation requires
some other input whose price has little correlation with the wage. If we want to think of
the wage in the current model as governing production workers and job creation costs being
associated with the effort of management employees, then to the extent that management
remuneration is uncorrelated with the wages of production workers it may make sense to
assume that creation costs do not vary on~for-one with wages. An empirically reasonable
specification for job crestion costs probably lies somewhere between the two extremes of zero
and unit elasticity we consider here.
We now examine whether the dflerential volatility in the job creation and destruction
schedules gives rise to differential volatility in job creation and destruction rates. In addition,
‘The fact that wage autocorrelation influenca the response of =tabkhments below the exit threshold
reflects the difference in the equilibrium response of the price level xross the two cases.
19Volatility Statistics
T = 1/2 T = W~/2
Volatility Statistic Data p=o.9 p=o p=o.9 p=o
Creation 0.86 0.10 0.17 0.11 0.30
Destruction 1.71 1.50 1.60 1.00 0.60
Growth 2.24 2.00 2.41 1.82 1.53
Reallocation 1.67 1.40 1.06 0.60 0.50
Note: The statistic for Creation is standard deviation in per cent. The other statistics are










T = 1/2 r = wt/2
p=o.9 p=o p=o.9 p=o
–0.40 –0.77 –0.79 –0.90
–0.43 –0.61 –0.02 0.75
0.75 0.91 0.94 0.99
–0.90 –0.97 –0.95 –0.96
0.27 –0.23 0.31 0.85
0.77 0.79 0.34 –0.55
Table 3: Employment Statistim in the Dynamic Economies
we extine several other employment flow statistics to evaluate the overall performance of
our model. Table 3 reports measures of volatility and co-movement for rates of job creation,
job destruction, job growth, and job reallocation as defined by Davis and Haltiwmger [8],
for each of the four specficatiom we consider.10 The first panel of the table indicates
overall employment volatility, as memured by the stmdard deviation of creation, as well
as the relative volatility of the remaining variables, M measured by the indicated miable’s
standmd deviation divided by the standard deviation of creation. The second panel indicates
correlation coefficients for all possible pa,irwisecombinations of the variablm of interwt.
Consider the top panel. Notice first that the constant creation cost examplw replicate
the empirical observation that job destruction is more variable than job creation. This is
10The statistics reported in table 3 are based on simulating the model for 1100 periods, beginning from the
steady state distribution of establishments. We discarded the fist 100 observations and used the remaining
observations in our calculations.
20in keeping with the intuition developed above. The failure of the variable creation cost
examples along this dimension reflects our previous observation that the job creation and
destruction schedules in these cases respond by proportionally similar amounts when the
wage changes.
The other statistics in this panel suggest that the constant creation cost version of the
model has other desirable properties. In particular, regardl~ of the degree of serial correla-
tion in the wage, this version of the model is able to account for the relative volatilities of the
employment flow variables. Increasing the degree of serial correlation seems to improve the
empirical performance in terms of the magnitudes of the relative volatility statistics. The
variable cost examplw are less successful in terms of accounting for relative volatilities. Fi-
nally, the main drawback of all these examples is that they imply too little overall volatility.
Reducing serial correlation in the wage appears to improve the performance of the model
along this dimension regardless of whether creation costs are variable or not.
Now consider the lower panel of correlations. The performance of che constant creation
costs, p = 0.9 version of the model is seen to be quite strong here ~~ well. The signs of
the six correlations are correct and the magnitudes do not appear to k \WWfar off their
empirical values either. It seems reasonable to conclude that the overall performance of
this version of the model is good – the addition of job creation costs has the potential of
accounting for more than just the fact that job destruction is more volatile than job creation.
Reducing serial correlation in the wage in the constant cost case hmms the model’s c~
movement implications. In particular, when p = Othe model predicts counteract ually that
job creation is negatively correlated with job reallocation. Finally, the specifications with
variable creation costs perform poorly in terms of c~movement, just as they do with respect
to relative volatilities.
At this point we should caution the reader by noting that the statistics in table 3 do
not reflect entirely independent featurm of the data. We have already pointed out (in the
introduction) that the relative volatility of destruction versus creation determines the sign
of the correlation between job growth and reallocation. The algebraic identities linking
creation and destruction with growth and reallocation imply other connections between the
21statistics. 11 However, we do not believe this fact diminishes the overall impression that the
constant creation cost, p = 0.9 version of the model does remmkably well at accounting for
the evidence on employment flows.
4. Discussion
The simulations dwcribed in the previous section confirm that the presence of asymmetric
employment adjustment costs at the establishment level can lead to asymmetric in aggregate
gross job flows. Of course, the presence of such costs is not the only available explanation
for this phenomenon. In this section we conclude by describing how our work relates to
other attempts to account for the evidence on job creation and destruction. Recall horn
the introduction that the observation of countercyclical job reallocation is equivalent to the
observation that job destruction is more volatile than job creation. The discussion below
considers papers which share our focus on the variability of job creation and destruction.
To begin with. consider Caballero [2]. He observed that asymmetric emplopent adjust-
ment costs at the establishment level need not imply aggregate asymmetries. His explanation
for the aggregate asymmetries relies on wsuming that aggregate shocks are asymmetrically
distributed. Since we consider only symmetrically distributed aggregate shocks, we atab-
Iish that the aggregate asymmetries in employment flows may have nothing to do with the
pattern of aggregate shocks and may be purely reflective of features of the microeconomy.
Another explanation of aggregate employment asymmetries is provided by Caballero and
Harnrnour[3]. They construct a partial equilibrium model where jobs embody technological
progr~. The key assumption in their model are that the costs of creating a job are
increasing in the a~egate volume of job creation, while the costs of destroying a job are
invariant to the aggregate volume of job destruction. Not surprisingly these assumptions
lead to a decrease in the relative volatility of aggregate job creation. Our analysis Mers in
that we assume asymmetric employment adjustment costs at the establishment level rather
than at the aggregate level.
11Simple calcdations reveal the following connections. If creation and destruction are negatively correlated
then (i) growth and crmtion are positively correlated, (ii) growth and destruction are negatively correlated,
(iii) reallocation is less variable than growth, and (iv) growth is more variable than destruction.
22Finally, Foote [10] studies an (S, s) model in which the trend growth rate in industry
employment determin= the volatility of job creation relative to that of job destruction. In
his model, industry decline leads to the bunching of establishments neu theirjob destruction
points so that aggregate disturbances have a disproportionate impact on job destruction. An
-sential assumption in his analysis is that the decline in industry employment is carried out
by lowering average establishment size while leaving the number of establishments constant.
Our analysis clmifies when this is, and is not, a reasonable assumption. In our framework,
if the source of industry decline is a reduction in demand, it will be wcommodated by a fall
in entry, not a decrease in average estabolishmentsize. However, average estabolishmentsize
will decline if the source of the trend is an increase in the wage rate.




we present the transition rule for Gt. TO do so we m“akeuse of several
define two critical productivity levels, z; and z;,
z: = Zt (M (z;)) and Z; = Z~(fit (z;))”
and n; as
The functions gt (zt) and ~t (z~) intersect the exit threshold Zt (nt)at the points (z;, n;) and
(z:,~), respectively. Third, define & (n,) and fit (n,) to be the inverse functions of ~ (z,)
and fit (zt), respectively. Finally, we use @(zt+l IZt) to denote the conditional density of z~+l
given Zt.
To present the transition rule for Gt (z~,nt), it is easiest to consider each of the three
functions, ~~ (zt), Et (z~), and Gm (zt, n~), sepmately. We begin by describing the third
of these functions. Any establishment with employment between the schedules defined by
~+1 (z~+l)and fit+l (z~+l) employs the same number of workers as it did in the previous
period. Therefore, to find the ‘number’ of establishments with productivity zt+l which
employ nt+l workers, we need to add the ‘probabilities’ of all ~tablishments with previous
employment n~+l having productivity equal to zt+l. Consider three separate cases. First, if
n~+l z ii:, then
(lo)
+@ (Zt+llh (~t+l)) Gt (ht (~t+l))
+@(Zt+l Ixt (n,+I)) u,(E,(n,+ I)).
The &t term is the contribution of those between the employment rules in period t with em-
ployment nt+l who remain there, the second term is the contribution of those who increased
their employment during the previous period to nt+l, and the final term is the contribution
of those who decreased their employment during the previous period to nt+l.
J
G:l (zt+l, nt+l ) = ~:;::;) G~ (Z~,nt+~) @(Z~+I lZ~) dzt
+@ (Zt+llh, (nt+l)) G, (ht(n,+I)).
(11)
The the differences between equations 10 and 11 reflect the exit of low productivity estab
lishrnents.
Finally, if ~~ > nt+l, then
Gfll (Zt+I, nt+l) = O. (12)
This is because all establishments with employment less than ~“ exit.
To determine ~t+l (zt+l), it is usefulto consider the same three cases. First, if Rt+l (zt+l)2





Once again, consider the same three cases to determine ~+1 (z~+l). If ~+1 (z~+l) Z Z,
then
Gt+l (z,+~) = L;’(z’+’’L;:)




+ G? (Zt, nt) @ (Zt+l Izt) dztdn~
E: Zt (nt )
J
Zt+l _




+ ~ (Zt) # (Zt+l[zt) dzt
z;
+Bt+l A(zt+~ ) .
(16)
The last term of this expression reflects the contribution of new entrants, who always increase
their employment above its previous level, zero.





Finally, if ~~ > m+l (zt+l), then
G+l (Zt+l) = ~t+l~ (Zt+l) . (18)
B. The Case of Costless Job Creation
In this appendix we characterize analytically a version of the model with costless job creation.
This example is helpful since it illustrates a case where the usumption of strictly positive
entry, which underlies our strategy for computing equilibria in the more general version of
the model, is guaranteed to hold.
Here we simplify the model of the main text in two ways: (1) we set T = O; and (2) we
assume tit elastic demand, ~ = – 1. To begin with, note that if job creation is costlws





This implies a one-to-one mapping between productivity levels and employment so keeping
tr~ of the joint distribution of employment and productivity y is pointless. Thus, we w-rite
the industry’s state variable M Gt (zt), which describes the measure of productivity over all
=tablishments.
Theorems 2, 3, and 4 of Hopenha~ [11] gumantee that the model with zero adjustment
costs has a unique station~ equilibrium and that stationary equilibrium entry and exit
are strictly positive. 12 Suppose the industry’s initial measure over productivity y levels is the
stationary equilibrium measure, G* (zt), and that the wage in the current period is Wt instead
of the due used to compute the stationary equilibrium, W*. In this case static profits of
an establishment with productivity Zt are
Now, choose a price Pt so that nt (zt) equals its stationary equilibrium comterpti,
(19)
At this price profits of establishments as a function of productivity are the same as in the
120ur model satisfies conditions U1 and U2 of Hopenhayn [11].
26stationary equilibrium. Suppose the competitive equilibrium output price is given by (19) in
each period t. In this exe, since one period returns are the same as in the station~ equi-
librium, the establishment owner’s value function and exit decision rule will be unchanged
by the addition of aggregate uncertainty. If the value function is unchanged horn the sta-
tionmy equilibrium, the free entry condition must still be satisfied. Therefore, if B* new
establishments begin production during date t,the measure over productivity in that date
will equal G* (z~).
We now examine whether Pt as given by (19) is a market clearing price. Our task is
to verify that aggregate demand equals aggregate supply at each date t with this price.
Consider fist aggregate supply. If Pt is the prevailing price and the current wage equals W~,
the output of a single establishment with productivity Zt is
()
@Pt *
qt (~t) = Zt. — w~
()
—a
= q’(z~) # , (20)
where q* (zt) is the output of an et abolishmentwith productivity level z~in the stationary
equilibrium. Therefore, aggregate output is given by
where we have assumed that B* new establishments begin production at every date t. Also,
Q* is the stationary equilibrium aggregate supply. Now consider aggregate demand. The
aggregate quantity demanded at the price Pt is
() p:=p*-1 ~ -“
w*
* Wt ‘a = Q(T) *
Thus, the price given in (19) is indeed a market clearing price for every date t. Note
that the equilibrium we have constructed is for an initial measure of establishments across
productivity levels equal to the stationary equilibrium measure. In this special case, it is clear
that the assumption of positive entry in every possible state is valid since B* is guaranteed
to be positive.
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